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For additional background on this subject
the reader is referred to Chapter 16 of
"Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine"
which is reproduced as an addendum at the
end of this section.
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Historically, studies of man/mach'ine interfaces have focused on proper
allocation of system operating functions between man and machine. A
typical approach has been to analyze task sequences to discover task
components and allocate these functions to man or machine, depending
upon which would be better at the particular task. Man is able to
handle a variety of information processing tasks in which input (sensory)
and output (motor) aspects vary widely. He is able to store and recall
great amounts of information pertinent to system operation under both
normal and emergency conditions. He is able to operate as a decision-
maker through his capability to evaluate information and to distinguish
between useful and unusable and irrelevant information. He can solicit
additional information from the system when necessary, and can estimate
probabilities. The human operator can respond to the unforeseen and
operate at a level of complexity exceeding any reasonable amount of
premission planning and programming of on-board automatic control
equipment. So far, man is the only real-time system capable of accepting
and operating on asynchronous and nonsequential input data.
Man's capabilities for sensing data have been studied longer and more
thoroughly than any other aspect of his performance. Much information
is available concerning the basic processes of seeing, hearing, and
sensing motion. Significant aspects of man's sensory capabilities are
shown. Such data are in substantial agreement in US and Soviet hand-
book compilations.
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The increase in the number and scope of Apollo and Skylab mission
objectives is indicated by the growth in the number of stowed items.
This growth reflects increase in crew size, duration of missions, and
emphasis on scientific objectives as operational maturity evolves. An
analysis of the information shows that growth is caused primarily by
time-dependent operational items (e.g., food and film) and by increased
emphasis on scientific and applications experiment activities.
The number of items increased, also the diversity and complexity of
the items. The number of stowed items increased by a factor of 4, even
when the items attributable to more crewmen and a longer mission were
omitted.
The relationship of crew size, pressurized volume, and usable volume of
each spacecraft is shown. The usable volume is defined as that within
the pressure vessel not occupied by equipment and that can be used for
temporary stowage, movement by the crewmen, or other functions that
enhance habitability. The volumes increased noticeably from the first
to the present spacecraft configurations. For the Mercury and Apollo
command module spacecraft, the relationship of the pressurized volume
to effective free volume reflects that most equipment was installed
within the pressure vessel. Gemini and lunar module spacecraft had
only the crew instrument panels and portions of the environmental control
system installed within the pressure vessel. Estimates of the volumes
for Soviet spacecraft indi cate similar arrangements.
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NASA-S-81-2280
MERCURY
SPACE CRAFT STOWAGE
COMPARTMENTS VOLUME ITEMS
NUMBER (m 3) STOWED
- - 48
GEMINI 13 .42 19.6
APOLLO 25 2.12 1727
SKYLAB 241 19.36 10,160
ASTP 32 2.65 1965
SHUTTLE 55 4.44 1084
SPACE STATION 300 80.0 20,000
NASA-S-81-2285
HABITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
EFFECTIVE
SPACECRAFT HABITABLE
SPACECRAFT NO. PRESSURIZED INTERIOR FREE VOLUME PER
CREWMEN VOLUME. 1 m 3 VOLUME. 1 m 3 CREWMAN, m 3
a...
MERCURY I l._ o.7l o.71
VOSTOK ! :Lss 2.oo 2.00
GEMINI . = 2.zt t.ls o.s7
VOSKHOI_ = on a 4Js =.u 1.u.._
APOLLO
COMMAND MODULE =l L|S r.:rt 2.41
LUNAR MODULE 2 e.ea $.2s 2.s2
SOYUZ
COMMAND MODULE 170 =1 4.el • 3.x a.mll.32
ORBITAL MODULE I TO 3 11.22 4.53 4.$.111.51
SKYLAB
COMMAND MODULE = LSS _.24 2.41
ORBITAL ASSEMBLY TOTAL 3 3sl.oe 31s.oo tos.3s
SHUTTLE
CRE'WVCABIN a TO 7 7o.a 3s.| 11.81o s.1
SPACELAB 4 TO 7 el 47.S 11.9 TO e.I
,| i
'SPACE STATION' • TO 12 300 TO 400 200 25 TO 15
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A pictorial of Spacelab and Shuttle habitable area is shown.
of available space is shown in the table.
A comparison0
A comparison of habitable space for Skylab, Salyut, and projected
Space Operation Center and Science and Applications Manned Space
Platform.
0
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NASA-S-77-11643
SPACE SHUTTLE
HABITABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
TOTAL
PRES SUR I ZED
VOLUME
/43 (FT3)"
ORBITER CREW CABIN 70.3 (2q75)
TRANSFER TUNNEL 8.6 (303)
SPACELAB
LONG 72.q "(2570)
USEABLE
VOLUME
M3 (FT 3)
35.6 (1250)
8.6 (303)
39.0 (1448)
151.3 (50_8) 73.2 (3001)
"SPACE STATIONS" -- A PERSPECTIVE
SPACELAB
HABITABLE VOLUME
22M 3
/ HABITABLE VOLUME
._/// =4SMa _/
SALYUT
HABITABLE VOLUME
m,q_ ,,m,,,.,. ,m,. .u BOM3
_" II-9
5
_LL] '
ir--] SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER
SOC
HABITABLE VOLUME
209M 3
SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS
MANNED SPACE PLATFORM
(SAMSPI
HABITABLE VOLUME "
66M a
Shown are relationships of spacecraft volume, mission duration, and
crew size to similar values for submersibles and aircraft. In all
vehicles, the pressurized or conditioned volume of the vehicle increases
as a function of both crew size and mission duration. Mission duration
can be varied extensively for a given vehicle; however, for smaller
vehicles, significant stresses may be placed on the crewmen.
An illustration of the weight and number of items related to on-board
data management is shown.
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NASA-S-81-2283
MERCURY
GEMINI
APOLLO
SKYLAB
ASTP
SHUTTLE
SPACE STATION _
ASSUMES:
ON BOARD DATA MANAGEMENT
NUMBER
OF
WEIGHT (kg) ITEMS
1.1 4
2.2 10
8.3 21
13.0 34
70.5 83
18.6 34
28.6 37
75
50.0
GROUND-TO-STATION DATAFAX.
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The complexity, size, and number of display consoles in spacecraft
have increased with more complicated missions and design commitment to
the maximum effective use of crewmen.
The number of measurements required for each mission has grown from
Mercury to Skylab. While the number ha.s increased further from Shuttle r_
to Space Station, the use of real-time control on-board and data base
management from the ground will reduce the load on the crew and mission
control substantially.
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NASA-S-81-11057 STS-1 OPERATIONS
NORMAL FLIGHT
SYSTEMS CHECKOUTS/GO-NO GO's/FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES
ASCENT ABORTS
• RTLS
• AOA
• ATO
• ROTA
• CONT
• 2 SSME FAIL
• 3 SSME FAIL
• ORBIT 5 DE-ORBIT
• CONTINGENCY LANDING
SITE DE-ORBIT
• DAY 2 ENTRY
SYSTEMS OPERATIONS
DDS ELEC OMS RCS ECLS - APU HYD PBD MPS COMM
p,
FAILURE CASES
ASC/ON-ORBIT/ENTRY
• LOSS OF 1 FUEL CELL/ELECT
BUSSES
• LOSS OF 1 FREON LOOP
• LOSS OF TOPPING EVAP
• LOSS OF HIGH LOAD EVAP
ASCJON-ORBIT/ENTRY
• LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE
• LOSS OF 2 FUEL CELLS
• LOSS OF 2 FREON LOOPS
• LOSS OF 2 WATER LOOPS
• LOSS OF BOTH EVAPS
• LOSSOF BOTH CABIN FANS
ORBIT
• EVA TO CLOSE
PBD's.
• EMERGENCY D/O
ASCPCL - 106PGS
ORBPCL - 104 PGS
ENTPCL . 106PGS
MALF PROC - 688 PGS
NASA-S-81-2284,
SPACECRAFT SYSTEM INFORMATION
PROGRAM
MERCURY
TOTAL
MEASUREMENTS
DISPLAYED
TO CREW
DISPLAYED
TO MISSION
CONTROL
100 53 85
GEMINI 225 75 202
APOLLO
CM 475 } 280 } 336 }948 494 61.5LM 473 214 279
SKYLAB
2241 615 2034
OAM 1720 326 1669
SHUTTLE 7831 2170 3826
'SPACE STATION '_J 10,000 4000 4000
l(J) ASSUMES REAL-TIME CONTROL ONBOARD, DATA BASE MANAGEMENT
FROM THE GROUND
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The technology of display and control components grew substantially
more sophisticated from Project Mercury to the Gemini program, and
this new technology was further refined for the Apollo and Skylab
programs. Increased complexity of the displays and controls emphasizes r_
the importance of crew functions on success of the mission; the emphasis
is on finding the most efficient means to convey information to the
crew,
o,..
Self Explanatory
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NASA-S-81-2281
CREW DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
PANELS W6RK CONTROL COMPUTERS
STATIONS DISPLAY NUMBER/MODES
ELEMENTS
MERCURY 3 1 143 0
GEMINI 7 2 354 1
APOLLO (_) 40 7 1374 4150
SKYLAB (_) 189 20 2980 4
\
SHUTTLE 97 9 2300 51140
'SPACE STATION' (_ 200 40 3000 8/200
1 - PRIMARY AND BACKUP IN CM AND LM
2 - CM PRIMARY AND BACKUP, TELESCOPE, WORKSHOP
3 - ASSUMES REAL TIME CONTROL ON BOARD, DATA BASE
MANAGEMENT FROM THE GROUND
NASA-S-81-2282
CREW SOFTWARE INTERFACES
APOLLO
CM
PROGRAMS 43
VERBS 85
NOUNS 92
LM
PROGRAMS 31
VERBS 78
NOUNS 8.5
SHUTTLE
DISPLAYS 75
ITEM ENTRY 50
OPERATIONAL
SEQUENCES
MAJOR MODES
9
16
• HARDWlRE MEMORY
• 3 REGISTER DISPLAY
• NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE
& FLIGHT CONTROL
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• READ WRITE ACCESS
GENERAL MEMORY
MASS MEMORY
• 3 ALPHANUMERIC &
GRAPHIC DISPLAY CRT
• NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, FLIGHT
CONTROL & SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT
• REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
The following two charts summarize comments on various items that
effected habitability and performance on the first four Shuttle flights.
Comments Continued
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TEMPERATURE:
RELATIVE
HUMIDITY=
ODORS:
SLEEP:
WINDOWS:
TELEPRINTER:
COMMUNICATIONS:
DISPLAYSAND
CONTROLS
S_Y STS-I_THRUSTS:4
CREWCOMMENTSDECREASEFROMSTS-1 TO STsiq WTIHFEWCOMMENTSONSTS-4
CLOUDYWINDOWS(AROUNDTHEEDGES)ANDCONDENSATION(FROMVENTDUCT)ON
AFT WINDOWSONSTS-3. NOCONDENSATION WINDOWS,WHENSHADESREMOVED,
ON STS-q. BETTERTHANSKYLAB.
SOMEBODYANDLAVATORYODORSDETECTED,MOSTADDRESSABLEBY WASHINGAND
DEODORANT"STICK-UPS." SOMESLIGHTLAVATORYODORSTILL DETECTABLEONSTS-4
PRIHARYTIIRUSTERS(RCS) CAN INTERFERWITHSLEEP
EXTERNALWHITEPOWDERYSUBSTANCEONWINDOWS1 AND6 ONSTS-I--NONE TtlERE-
AFTERTI{RUSTS-II
USEDLOTSOF PAPERONSTS-1 AND3--NO COMMENTSONSTS-2 ANDq
WIRELESSWORKS GOOD. MOLDEDEAR PIECESWORK PREI'IYWELL--WITHSOME EAR
SORENESS, THE CABINFANSARE RATHERNOISY.
SOMESWITCHESPROIRL{EPASTWICKETSAND WERE ACCIDENTALLYBUMPEDON STS-1
AND 2--NOCOMMENTSON SUCHTHEREAFTER
SOMECAUTIONAND WARNING(ALARMS)DISCREPANCIESON STS-4. PANELLIGHTSVERY
HOT
SUMMARYSTSI1 THRUSTSIq CONTINUED
LAVATORY:
STOWAGE:
HYGIENE=
FOOD:
WATER:
TIMELINE:
WORKLOAD:
INCONVIENTAND A LITTLEDIFFICULTTO USE, WHILESERVINGITS PURPOSE,
CONSIDERABLEIMPROVEMENTIS DESIRABLEAND WARRENTED
MORE VOLUMEFOR USEDARTICLESNEEDED. STS SHOULDHAVEA TRASHCOMPACTOR
WASHCLOTIISAND TOWELSCREATETRASHMANAGEMENTPROBLEM. SKYLABHAD A
WASHRAGSQUEEZER
GOOD, SANDWICIIESAND PREPAREDMEALS
GOOD. CHILLEDAND NO (ORMINIMAL)BUBBLES
QDES AND MULTIPLEACTIVITIESSOMETIMESRESULTIN VERY BUSYPERIODS--
SLACKAT OTHER TIMES. SOMETYPEOF ACTIVITIES"DISPLAY"SCOREBOARD
DESIRABLE
VERYIIEAVY
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The next two charts highlight con_nents from Shuttle flight I through 4
on items that could be changed to improve flight operations and habit-
abi lity.
Comments Continued
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"HIGHLIGHTS"STS-ITHRUSTS-q
STS-I=
STS'2:
MANYBITS OF DEBRIS(NUTS. BOLTS,ANDPENCILS_ OUTOF CRACKSANDCREVICES)
FLOATEDFREEIN THESPACECRAFTUNTIL THEYADHEREDTO THEAIR CONTROLFANS'
FILTERS. TIIECREWS'HEADSETEARPHONESWEREFREQUENTLYJERKEDOFF THEIRPROPER
LOCATIONSON THE USERS'EAR BY THE CONNECTINGCABLESBECOMINGTANGLEDDURING
ACTIVITIES.RESTOWAGE/REPACKAGINGOF EQUIPP£NTAND USEDARTICLES-'ASCOMPACTLY
AS PRE-MISSION--WASUSUALLYNOT POSSIBLE. TRASHGENERATEDBY THE TELEPRINTER
PRINTOUT,FOOD WRAPPERS,ETC.,WAS NOT EASYTO MANAGE. TilENOISELEVEL IN THE
SPACECRAFTWAS AROUND67 DECIBELS.THE LAVATORYDID NOT WORK PROPERLY,AND IT
WAS COLDTHE FIRSTSLEEPPERIOD.
SOUNDLEVELSON-ORBITWERENOT BAD,EXCEPTFOR REACTIONCONTROLSYSTEMENGINE
STARTUP-_WHICH"SOUNDEDLIKE A HOWITZER." SOMESTOWAGELOCKERDOORSWOULDN'T
LINE UP TO ALLOWPROPERLATCHING. THE "WIRELESS"CO_UNICATIONUNITSWERE VERY
USEFUL. THE CABIN TEMPERATUREVARIEDFROM DAY TODAY, BUT NEITHERTHE COOLEST
UR WARMESTTEMPERATURESWERE UNCOMFORTABLE.AN UNPLEASANTODORWAS DETECTED
AROUNDTHE LAVATORY. THE DRINKINGWATERHAD GAS BUBBLESIN IT.
STS-3:
STS-q:
THREE (3) OR FOUR (4) CAMERASDID NOT WORK. THE LAVATORYDID NOT WORKPROPERLY.
KLEENAXBECAMEA LIMITEDCONSUMABLE.THE TELEPRINTERSEEMSTO WASTEA LOT OF
PAPER. A LOT OF MOTION(PHYSICALACTIVITIES)SHOULDBE MINIMIZEDON FIRSTOR
SECONDDAY. TOOLSMAY BE GOODFOR CHANGINGENGINERATHERTIIANCHANGINGOUT
KEYBOARD. JET FIRINGREVERBERATETHROUGHVEHICLECOULDAFFECTSLEEP. NO
APPETITEFIRSTCOUPLEOF DAYS.
CABIN "ILLUMINATION"IS NOTGOODFORPHOTOGRAPItICPURPOSES.OVERHEADLIGHTS
WORTHLESSAROUNDTHECENTERCONSOLEAREAAT NIGHT. ASTRONAUTS'HEADCOMES
BEllrIEENLIGHT ANDOBJECTTOBE LOOKEDAT-'THE OVERH_DLIGHTSAREVERYHOT.
THECABINFANSARETHENOISIEST--THESILENCEWASDEAFENINGWHENTHEYWERE
TURNEDOFF, COMBINATIONREFRIGERATOR/FREEZERV YHELPFULlY-MADEMANYITEMS
PALATABLE,THELAVATORYIS A PROBLEM--ITWORKEDTHEWHOLEMISSION--JUSTVERY
[NCONVIENTANDTIME CONSUMING.
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These next two charts summarizeRussian activities on Salyut 6.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the crews contributed to six
mission saving repairs.
The Russians have extensive humanexperience in space. Manyof the
capabilities of Salyut 6 require an active humaninvolvement.
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MASA-5-82-07068
RUSSIAN MANNED ACTIVITY ON SALYUT 6
• SALYUT60ESIGNEOFORCREW
• ON BOARDh'_,INTENANCEAND MINORREPAIRS
• CARGOAND FUELTRANSFERFROMh_NNEDANDUNM.A.NNEDSUPPLY
VEHICLES
e CREWSHAVESIGNIFICANTLYUPGRADEDSALYUT6 SINCE INITIAL OPERATION
• NEWITEMS INSTALLED
• DOCKINGHATCHCONFIGURATIONCHANGED
• ASSEMBLEDRADIO TELESCOPE(KRT-10IAND DEPLOYEDIT THROUGHREAR
HATCH
• CREWSPERFORMEDATLEAST6 MISSION SAVING REPAIRS
• JETTISONEDKRT-10BY EVAAFTERENTANGLEMENTWITHDOCKIN(3TARGET
• ISOLATEDANDEMPTIEDFAULTYFUELTANK
NASA-S-B2-07069
RUSSIAN MANNED ACTIVITY ON SALYUT 6
• SECONDGENERATIONSTATION, REPRESENTINGNEWSTAGE
OFMANNED"COSMONAUTICS"- (REF:USSRNATIONAL
PAPER,UNISPACE'82)
• EXTENDED URATIONHUMANACTIVITY IN SPACE
• LYAKHOVANDRYUMIN, 175DAYS IN ORBIT, DEVOTED
- 113TIME TOTECHNOLOGICALWORK
° 113TIME TOEARTHOBSERVATIONS
• SALYUT6 CAPABILITYREQUIRINGM_N'S PRESENCE
• M/_.TERIALSPROCESSING
• BIOSCIENCE
• EAR:rHPHOTOGRAPHY
• ].5 METEROPTICALTELESCOPEOBSERVATIONS
• ]0METERRADIOTELESCOPEOPERATIONS
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The lessons learned from Salyut 6 as viewed by the Russians. Besides
effectively advancing space technology for the solution of scientific
and economic problems, the Salyut serves in effective political roles
in third world countries.
This chart provides a concise comparison between Russia and US human
roles in space. Because of the difference emphasis in programs, the
Russians have concentrated on the use of man in space and have more
manned hours in space.
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NASA-S-82-O7067
RUSSIAN VIEW OF LESSONS
LEARNED FROM SALYUT 6
• CONTINUOUSOPERATIONOFORBITALCOMPLEXESWITH REPLACEMENTCREWS
REPRESENTSTHEMOSTEFFECTIVEAND PROFITABLEADVANCEOFSPACETECHNOLOGY
FORSOLUTIONOFSCIENTIFIC ANDECONOMICPROBLEMS
• THEEXTENDEDMISSIONS PROVIDEDUNIQUEEXPERIENCEOFREPAIRANDMAIN-
TENANCEOPERATIONSUNDERSPACEFLIGHTCONDITIONS
• DESIGNPHILOSOPHYOFMAINTAINABLESPACECOMPONENTS_,_RE
DEVELOPED
• JOINT INTERNATIONALMANNEDFLIGHTSIS A NEWDOMAINOFTHESOCIALIST
COUNTRIES COOPERATION
• CURRENTLYBEINGEXTF.NDEDTOTHIRD WORLDAND NATOCOUNTRIES
NASA-S-82-07066
COMPARISONS BETWEEN RUSSIAN
AND U.S. HUMAN ROLES IN SPACE
• RUSSIANS HAVEMANY MOREMANNEDHOURSIN SPACE
• 5 MAJOR"EXPEDITIONS" (g5TO 185DAYSI; g VISITING EXPEDITIONSAND
IZ DELIVERYOPERATIONSAS OFM_RCH1981FORSALYUT6
• AFTER3 SKYLABMISSIONS (84 DAYSMAXIMUM), U.S. HAS CONCENTRATED
ONSORTIES INTOSPACE
• RUSSIANSHAVI_PERFORMED3EVA'S, PRESUMABLYALLRELATEDTO UNSCHEDULED
REPAIRS
• U .S. EVA'S ONSKYLABFORSAMr.REASON. PROJECTEDUSEFORSATELLITE
SERVICING UNMATCHEDAS YETBYRUSSIANS
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Design implication for future mannedoperation in space should consider
the listed items and their impact on productivity.
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L_C['t | _|! I Idll')l T/_ A'r T _ldC
L/L.OLt3il |i'lI-L.A_J_l I_,/i1_)
0 PRODUCTIVITYVS, MINIMALREQUIREHEHTS
EXAMPLES=
0 CABINNOISELEVELS
0 PERSPECTIVEDISPLAYS:-ORSITALGROUNDTRACK'
0 ANCILLARYEQUIPHENTS
- HOTIONPICTURECAHERA
- HANDCALCULATORS
0 HYGIENE
0 STOWAGE
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ADDENDUM
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